Recently, Lee et al. and Lin-Lai proposed fingerprint-based remote user authentication schemes using smart cards. We demonstrate that their schemes are vulnerable and susceptible to the attack and have practical pitfalls. Their schemes perform only unilateral authentication (only client authentication) and there is no mutual authentication between user and remote system, so their schemes suscept from the server spoofing attack. To overcome the flaw, we present a strong remote user authentication scheme by using fingerprint-biometric and smart cards. The proposed scheme is an extended and generalized form of ElGamal's signature scheme whose security is based on discrete logarithm problem, which is not yet forged. Proposed scheme not only overcome drawbacks and problems of previous schemes, but also provide a strong authentication of remote users over insecure network. In addition, computational costs and efficiency of the proposed scheme are better than other related schemes.
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