Presentation + Paper
8 October 2018 Quantum cryptography with malicious devices
Marcos Curty, Hoi-Kwong Lo
Author Affiliations +
Proceedings Volume 10803, Quantum Information Science and Technology IV; 1080303 (2018) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2502066
Event: SPIE Security + Defence, 2018, Berlin, Germany
Abstract
The current paradigm for the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on the legitimate users of the system trusting their devices, which include both the quantum communication components and the classical post-processing units. However, in view of the memory attacks recently proposed against device-independent QKD, as well as the many hardware and software Trojan Horse attacks that threaten the security of conventional cryptography today, such trust is a very strong and unjustified assumption. Here we review a recent proposal to solve this problem based on the use of verifiable secret sharing and redundancies. We show that this approach can deliver secret key rates which are comparable to those obtained in an ideal scenario with honest devices.
Conference Presentation
© (2018) COPYRIGHT Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE). Downloading of the abstract is permitted for personal use only.
Marcos Curty and Hoi-Kwong Lo "Quantum cryptography with malicious devices", Proc. SPIE 10803, Quantum Information Science and Technology IV, 1080303 (8 October 2018); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2502066
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KEYWORDS
Quantum key distribution

Information security

Quantum cryptography

Quantum communications

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